Explaining Electoral Volatility In Latin America Politics Essay

Explaining Electoral Volatility In Latin America Politics Essay Abstract Many existing explanations of electoral volatility in Latin America have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level. In this paper, I apply a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test various explanations of electoral volatility on data of 128 parties in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011. My most important finding pertains to the conditional effect of a partys incumbency status on electoral volatility. First, the results show that the effect of party age on reducing electoral volatility is stronger for incumbent parties. Second, an incumbent party has a lower level of electoral volatility than opposition parties during periods of stronger economic performance. Last, while an irregular alteration of political institutions is hypothesized to increase the level of volatility for all the parties in a country, the effect is more significant for the incumbent party. Explaining Electoral Volatility in Latin America: Evidence at the Party Level Introduction Concerns with party system institutionalization and its consequences in developing countries have grown in the past decade. Extant literature underscores that political parties play an important role in linking diverse social forces with democratic institutions, channeling societal demands, managing sociopolitical conflicts, holding government officials accountable to the electorate, and legitimizing the regime (Dix 1992; Sartori 1968; Schattschneider 1942). In this sense, political parties with stable and consistent support across elections not only ensure their long-term survival, but also help institutionalize the party system. A stable and institutionalized party system fosters more effective programmatic representation (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 157) and facilitates the institutionalization of political uncertainty (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). In contrast, a democratic country with a poorly institutionalized party system where electoral volatility is very high tends to produce populist leaders and discourage the incumbent party from making long-term policy commitments (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  [1]   In comparison to Western Europe and the United States, the level of electoral volatility is exceptionally high in Latin America (Payne et al. 2002). In the 1990s, the overall electoral volatility in this region was about twice that in the developed world (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Weak partisan identities of voters, rapid voting choice changes, and unpredictable election campaigns are prevalent political characteristics in this region (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006), but what explains the variation in electoral volatility in Latin America? Previous work on electoral volatility has provided explanations about political institutions, national economic performance, social cleavages, ethnic heterogeneity, and historical factors (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; Madrid 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005). These explanations have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level, even though that is the level at which th e effects of certain relevant explanatory factors are expected to work. Why do some parties have higher levels of electoral volatility than others? Do factors cause electoral volatility at the country level have the same impact on party level volatility? Does the incumbent party enjoy certain advantages that opposition parties do not have to secure electoral stability? This paper aims to address these questions by examining electoral evidence at the party level in Latin America. I generated a value of electoral volatility for each party between elections by performing Morgenstern and Potthoffs (2005) components-of-variance model on an original dataset of lower house electoral results at the district level for 128 parties in 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011. I first demonstrate that the patterns of electoral volatility at the party-level differ from that at the country level. I then apply a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test country-level, party-level, and cross-level hypotheses regarding why some parties are more electorally volatile th an others. The most important result of this study is that the incumbent parties and opposition parties have different behavioral patterns under certain conditions. Specifically, I find that a better national economic performance helps the incumbent party, rather than every party in the country, to reduce the level of electoral volatility. Moreover, I demonstrate that an irregular institutional change greatly increases the incumbent partys electoral volatility, rather than that of every party in the country. At the party level, I find that the effect of a partys incumbency status is contingent on certain party-specific characteristics. The results show that incumbent parties that were founded in earlier periods are generally less volatile than younger incumbent parties. These findings are robust after controlling for a variety of other explanatory factors that will affect electoral volatility, using a different sample of parties, or adopting a different model specification. In sum, relative to previous work, this study is distinctive in that it uncovers patterns of electoral volatility and provides a better understanding of the dynamics of party politics in new democracies. Why Study Party-level Electoral Volatility? I focus on party volatility in this paper, and I argue that examining electoral volatility at the party level facilitates a better understanding of the patterns of party development. In general, electoral volatility refers to the phenomenon in which voters switch voting choice in consecutive elections. Many previous have used the Pedersen Index  [2]  (Pedersen 1983) to operationalize the level of party system electoral volatility (Birch 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring 1999; Roberts and Wibbels 1999). However, as Mair (1997, 66) argues, aggregate volatility measurement such as the Pedersen Index explains little about the persistence or decay of political cleavages. Mainwaring et al. (2010) argue that the Pedersen Index fails to distinguish between the volatility caused by vote switches from one party to the other and the volatility caused by the entry and exit of parties from the political system. Morgenstern and Potthoffs (2005, 30) critique is that the Pedersen Index fails to account for the relative electoral movement of individual parties within the system; in other words, the Pedersen Index tells nothing about which party is more volatile than the others. This problematic feature may produce mistaken if not biased inferences. For instance, although the Pedersen Index indicates that Argentinas mean party system institutionalization is lower than that of Brazil and Mexico from the 1980s to the 2000s (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 159), it does not indicate that Argentinas electoral volatility is largely a result of the crisis of the Unià ³n Cà ­vica Radical (UCR) instead of the incumbent Partido Justicialista (PJ) (Levitsky 1998, 461). In short, aggregate electoral volatility is likely to mask patterns of party-level electoral volatility. The level of electoral volatility matters for a party because it is an important indicator of a partys long-term survival. Party volatility is also an indicator of party institutionalization (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). According to Janda (1980, 26-7), an institutionalized party should have stable partisan support because it can secure stable representation by building strong and regular societal ties with the electorate. A more institutionalized party should have a lower level of electoral volatility and a higher probability to survive over time, and it also implies that this party has a stable, routinized organizational structure and/or supporters with strong partisanship (Levitsky 1998). As Randall and Svà ¥sand (2002) contend, a high level of party system institutionalization does not necessarily indicate that all the parties within the system have an equally high level of party institutionalization. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that a high level of country volatility implies that all the parties in this country are equally volatile between elections. Therefore, a more important research question needs to be addressed: Is a partys electoral volatility determined by country-level factors, features of the party, or both? In the next section, I will discuss and propose testable hypotheses for the empirical analyses. Explaining Party Volatility Party volatility considers the degree to which a partys average vote is stable across two consecutive elections. Previous studies about country-level electoral volatility have considered national economic performance, political institutions, and social structural factors as three competing theoretical explanations of electoral volatility. However, some of the tested hypotheses, particularly those regarding economic voting and institutional theories, are actually derived from behavioral patterns of individual parties. Thus, these hypotheses should be tested at a more appropriate level, that is, the party level. Unlike previous studies of electoral volatility that focus on country-level explanations, this paper focuses on explaining party-level volatility, and such a research design facilitates the testing of party-level, country-level, and cross-level hypotheses. In particular, I argue that the behavior of the incumbent party is different from opposition parties. Moreover, I contend that the effect of a partys incumbency status is contingent on certain factors. Next, I will discuss various competing theoretical arguments about party electoral volatility at different analytical levels. Party Age and Incumbency Status Previous studies have discussed how time affects electoral volatility at the country level. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) argue that an older system is likely to have deeper and stronger historical roots in society than younger ones. Therefore, the level of electoral volatility will decrease with the age of a party system. Adopting a similar approach, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) propose a democratization timing explanation for why some party systems are more stable than others. The authors demonstrate that the level of democratic governance voters have experienced will affect the level of electoral volatility. In other words, what matters for accounting for stabilization of party competition is the timing when democracy began in the country. Voters in democracies that were created in earlier periods had stronger attachments to parties, so that can help forge stable patterns of party competition (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 163). In contrast, political elites in new democracies have less in centive to make efforts in party building, since they tend to depend on mass media and modern campaigns to win the elections. While Mainwaring and Zocos thesis sheds light on the relationship between democratic learning and party system stabilization, it ignores the variation of party age within a country. Clearly, old and young parties can exist in both old and new democracies in Latin America.  [3]  However, Mainwaring and Zocos argument might imply that party volatility will be higher in a newly-founded democracy, regardless of how old a party is in this country. To avoid this problematic inference, a more appropriate research strategy is to test Mainwaring and Zocos argument at the party level. Specifically, if Mainwaring and Zocos argument holds at the party level, we may expect that political parties that were founded in earlier periods will have lower levels of electoral volatility, because their supporters have much stronger partisan attachments than the supporters of younger parties. In contrast, younger parties will have higher levels of electoral volatility because the elites of these parties will have less incentive to delve into party building. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is generated: H1: A party that was founded in earlier periods will have a lower level of electoral volatility than a party that was founded later. The second testable hypothesis of this study is about a partys incumbency status. Some scholars argue that institutions such as states and parties might have their own strategic goals and behave as political actors in their own right (Cox and McCubbins 1993). While parties can be different in terms of various characteristics, whether or not a party is the presidents party is a crucial for explaining differences in party behavior. Incumbency advantage generally implies that incumbents are more likely to win an election than the counterpart nonincumbents (Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974). Cox and Katz (1997) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) decomposed the concept of incumbent advantage into three elements: (1) direct officeholder effect, such as opportunities for providing constituency services (Fiorina 1977; King 1991) and using legislative resources such as personal staff for performing casework (Cover and Brumberg 1982); (2) the ability of incumbents to scare off high-quality challengers (Kr asno and Green 1988); and (3) the generally higher quality of the incumbents due to their experiences and campaign skills (Fenno 1978). The literature on incumbent advantage provides useful insights for this study. Since presidency is often considered as an extraordinarily important political institution in Latin America (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), it is expected that the presidents party has advantages that opposition parties do not have. In particular, the incumbent party is more likely to receive access to public funds and more capable in allocating targeted resources to secure its survival (Calvo and Murillo 2004). Although being an incumbent party does not necessarily indicate a higher probability of winning an election in the contemporary Latin American context, it is reasonable to expect that an incumbent party should have a more stable electoral performance than opposition parties. However, an incumbent party in a new democracy might not have a stable electoral performance under certain circumstances. The experience in Latin America suggests that, when a country is governed by a new party, the patterns of electoral competition will become more unstable. In Peru, Alberto Fujimoris self-coup in 1992 and the adoption of a new constitution in 1993 helped to dramatically increase votes for the incumbent Cambio 90 in the 1995 election. However, Fujimoris 40-point plunge in public approval ratings in mid-1997 (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 586), and the demise of Fujimoris party in the 2000 and 2001 elections, not only suggest a high level of unpopularity of Fujimoris neoliberal structural reforms, but also a high level of fluid electoral preference when a country is governed by a new party. Although the effect of a partys incumbency status on party electoral volatility might not be clear, it is possible that this effect is conditional on other factors. In particular, if party age helps to reduce electoral volatility, it then makes sense that the effect should be stronger for the incumbent party. An incumbent party with an older age suggests that it not only has more access to use state resources to enhance its electoral competitiveness, but it also has stronger party organizations and members. Put differently, an older incumbent party might have a lower level of electoral volatility than a young incumbent party. Therefore, I generate the following hypothesis: H2: The effect of party age on reducing electoral volatility is stronger for an incumbent party. Incumbency, National Economy, and Institutional Change Besides the party-level hypotheses, I also test cross-level hypotheses to see whether the effect of a partys incumbency status is contingent on certain country-level factors. The first cross-level explanation concerns the interaction between incumbency and economy. Economic voting theory argues that some citizens will respond to the waxing and waning of the economy by shifting their votes to reward or punish incumbent parties and officeholders (Lewis-Beck 1988). In other words, electoral volatility is driven by voters retrospective evaluations of economic performance of the incumbent government. More specifically, economic hardship can be expected to increase electoral volatility by undermining the loyalties and support for the incumbent party and by increasing the opposition parties votes. By contrast, in a better economic climate, one would expect that people prefer to maintain the status quo by continuing to support the incumbent party so that electoral volatility decreases. The proposition that economic conditions shape election outcomes in democratic countries is robust for studies using individual survey data (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). In contrast, analyses of electoral volatility at the country level find inconsistent evidence about economic voting. Remmer (1991; 1993) and Madrid (2005) demonstrate that economic performance has a significant impact on the level of electoral volatility in Latin America. The evidence in advanced democracies also shows that economic performance strongly shapes electoral volatility (Bischoff forthcoming). However, recent analyses of new democracies in post-communist Europe (Epperly 2011) and Africa (Ferree 2010) show that economic voting is not a crucial factor in explaining party system volatility. One possible explanation for these inconsistent findings pertains to the appropriateness of the level of analysis. Specifically, since economic voting theory suggests that national economic performance will affect the extent of vote switches between the incumbent party and opposition parties between elections, it is more appropriate and necessary to test this argument at the party level. If the economic voting argument holds, it is expected that the incumbent party will have a lower electoral volatility than opposition parties when the economic performance is better. Conversely, the incumbent party is expected to have a higher electoral volatility than the opposition parties when the economy is in crisis. Based on the logic of economic voting, I propose the following economic voting hypothesis on party volatility: H3: The incumbent party will have a lower level of electoral volatility than opposition parties when the national economy is better. The second cross-level explanation is about the interaction between incumbency and institutional change. As the literature of rational choice institutionalism indicates, institutions matter because political actors behavior is driven mainly by a strategic calculus facing the limitation and opportunities that particular institutional or organizational settings offer (Hall and Taylor 1996). The stable persistence of political institutions that regulate electoral competition helps political parties to socialize their voters over time, and upholds the legitimacy of a democratic regime. Therefore, a fundamental alteration or an irregular discontinuity in important political institutions is expected to have a shock effect on the competitive equilibrium of elections. Based on evidence from Latin American countries, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Madrid (2005) find that the electoral dynamics of a party system is greatly altered by the adoption of a new constitution, a significant enfranchisement, and/or irregular changes in the executive branch such as a presidential self-coup (autogolpe), or a forced resignation of the president. Although these dramatic and irregular alterations of existing institutions are found to increase electoral volatility at the country level, it makes sense that such shocks should also influence party-level electoral volatility. In particular, it is expected that such irregular institutional changes will increase the volatility of the incumbent party to a greater extent. Recent political developments in Latin America suggest that this hypothesis is reasonable. For instance, in Ecuador the adoption of a new constitution in 2008 helped the incumbent Alianza PAIS increase its level of voter support in the 2009 election. In contrast, irregular removal of presidents also leads to higher electoral volatility for incumbent parties, but in a negative direction. The 2009 Honduran coup dà ©tat with the removal of President Manuel Zelaya made his Partido Liberal de Honduras (PLH) suffer a significant loss in the election at the end of the year. Likewise, the resignation of President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 2000 also led to an electoral fiasco for the governing Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria. Based on the discussion above, I propose the following hypothesis: H4: The incumbent party will have a higher level of electoral volatility than opposition parties after a shock of an irregular institutional discontinuity. Alternative Explanations of Party Volatility In the empirical analysis, I control for a number of factors that are likely to affect party volatility. At the party level, I control for the size of a party. Party size may influence the stability of electoral performance. The literature of legislators party switching suggests that larger parties in the legislature are more attractive to potential party switchers because they generally have more political influence (Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2008). Therefore, it is possible that a larger party should have a lower level of electoral volatility because it is more attractive to voters who are unwilling to waste their votes on parties with little chance to win the elections. However, it is also possible that smaller parties, especially those with strong regional base, may have low electoral volatility. It is because such parties are able to sustain their survival by securing a small but strong portion of the electorate over time. At the country level, I control for party system fragmentation and ethnic fractionalization. First, according to Pedersen (1983), electoral volatility increases with the number of parties in a system because a greater number of parties suggests that the ideological difference between the parties is small so that voters tend to switch their votes from one party to another between elections. In addition, party system fragmentation will destabilize democratic regimes because it tends to inhibit the construction of inherent legislative majorities (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 578). Although the hypothesis of party system fragmentation has only been tested at the country level in previous literature (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Birch 2003; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005), it is possible that a fragmented party system will increase electoral volatility at the party level. Another factor that may explain electoral volatility is social cleavages. Madrid (2005, 3) observes that the theoretical expectation that stronger ethnic cleavages help stabilize party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) presumes that parties will provide quality representation of distinct ethnic groups and establish strong linkages with them. In Latin America, this expectation does not hold since most party systems have been composed principally of catch-all parties that have drawn support from a variety of social groups. Because minority ethnic groups would not feel well-represented under this context, the level of electoral volatility tends to be higher since it is unlikely for them to form strong partisan identities (Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Madrid 2005). In short, it is expected that Latin American parties in a highly ethnically fragmented social context will have higher levels of electoral volatility. Last, following previous studies of country-level electoral volatility (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005; Madrid 2005), I control for a trend factor of party electoral volatility in the model. In a cross-sectional time-series design, Trend controls for the potential problem of spurious correlation when the values of the dependent variable and the independent variables vary independently but in a consistent direction over time. Measurement and Data The unit of analysis in this research is party-elections-country (e.g. Partido dos Trabalhadores 1994-1998 in Brazil). My conception of the dependent variable requires the collection of legislative electoral returns at the district level across time, differentiated by party or party coalition.  [4]  The data include 128 parties in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011 (N=527).  [5]  Most district-level electoral data are compiled from official electoral results on the website of each countrys electoral administrative body.  [6]  For the countries that were democratized later in the 1980s or in the 1990s, only the elections after the first democratic election were included.  [7]  Since Latin American countries have different timing of democratization and term length, the data structure of this analysis is unbalanced. A party is selected for the analyses if the party once obtained more than 5% of votes in any legislative election hel d between 1978 and 2011 in the country. This selection criterion ensures the inclusion of a diversity of parties. To generate the value of party volatility, I adopted Morgenstern and Potthoffs (2005) components-of-variance model on district-level data between two consecutive legislative elections held within the same constituency border.  [8]  One major advantage of this components-of-variance model is that it simultaneously takes into account various features of a partys electoral performance when generating the value of party volatility. Specifically, Morgenstern and Potthoffs model enables the calculation of three components of a partys vote share in a particular election: volatility, district heterogeneity, and local vote. While Morgenstern and his colleagues have used the latter two components for the research about party nationalization (Morgenstern and Swindle 2005; Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola 2009), I focus on the first component, i.e., party electoral volatility, in this paper. The volatility score assigned for each observation is a continuous variable with values that rang e from 0 to à ¢Ã‹â€ Ã… ¾, where higher numbers indicate a higher level of electoral volatility for the party. My primary party-level independent variables are Incumbency, Party age, and Incumbency*Party age. Incumbency is a dichotomous variable, measuring whether a party was the presidents party in two consecutive elections. Following Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), I measure Party age as the natural log of the number of years from the year when the party was officially founded to the year of 2011. The value of this variable does not vary over time, but is constant for all electoral periods for a given party. The interaction term, Incumbency*Party age, examines whether the effect of a partys age on volatility is contingent on a partys incumbency status. To test the economic voting hypothesis, I use two economic indicators: GDP growtht1 and Inflationt1.  [9]  GDP growtht1 is lagged by one year to capture the short term economic impact on volatility. Inflation rate is operationalized as the logged value of the inflation rate for the year before the election year. The logged inflation rate is used to prevent cases of hyperinflation from skewing the results.  [10]  To test whether the effect of the national economy on party volatility is conditional on a partys incumbency status, I include two interaction terms: Incumbency*GDP growtht1 and Incumbency*Inflationt1. In addition, to test whether a shock of institutional alteration will affect the incumbent party to a greater extent, I include two variables: Institutional discontinuity and Incumbency*Institutional discontinuity. I use the index constructed by Roberts and Wibbels (1999) to measure institutional discontinuity. The index ranges from 0 to 3, assigning one point to each of the following types of discontinuities: the adoption of a new constitution; an increase in voter turnout of more than 25 percent due to the enfranchisement of new voters; and an irregular change in executive authority, including a presidential self-coup (autogolpe), a forced resignation of the president, the ouster of the president due to impeachment, or a failed coup dà ©tat attempt when the president was temporarily ousted from the office.  [11]   Finally, I control for several party-level and country-level variables in the model. Party size is measured as the vote share of the party in the previous election.  [12]  Party system fragmentationt1 is measured as the index of the effective number of parties (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), lagged by one election.  [13]  Ethnic Fragmentation is measured as Fearons (2003) ethnic fractionalization index. Last, the variable Trend is measured as the number of years since the first election in which a party participated. Estimation Techniques To test the hypotheses about party-level electoral volatility, I employ a hierarchical linear model (HLM) on my three-level data. The three-level model is specified as a level-1 submodel that describes how each party changes over time, a level-2 submodel that describes how these changes differ across parties, and a level-3 model that describes how parties and changes differ across countries. An attractive feature of a multilevel models is its ability to model cross-level interactions in the estimation. Another important advantage of the HLM approach is being able to account for both fixed effects and random effects. In this study, the fixed-effects coefficients and parameters of the HLM estimate a regression line that describes the sample of parties as a whole, while the random-effect parameters reflect variation across parties and variation across countries. Application of the HLM in this study will specify three different levels of analysis: The level-1 submodel represents the rela tionship of time-varying characteristics on party volatility, the level-2 model will incorporate party-level effects that are fixed over time, and level-3 will introduce country-level effects that are fixed over time. I estimate the model using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML). In contrast to full MLE estimation, REML takes into account the degrees of freedom consumed by estimation of the fixed effects by eliminating fixed effects from the likelihood fu

The Importance of Global Awareness Essay -- Politics Political Essays

The Importance of Global Awareness   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The United States has been considered a leader in the global world of awareness since the beginning of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. It is the one country that has influenced international economics, world politics. As a college student, I have become aware that most of my classmates and friends are not concerned about foreign affairs. Americans, especially college students need to know what is going on around them. It is a vital part of our promising future that we understand the importance of global awareness. A rising controversial question that I have noticed as a student is: why is the United States considered a leading global power when we have so many problems of our own? How did we gain such a prestigious title? This â€Å"world leader† title is inconsistent because people, especially youths and college students don’t care about what is happening around the world. That is the most horrific problem of all. Apathy is worse than hate and ignorance because Americans don’t want to know and don’t care to understand about foreign affairs.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   There are many solutions to apathy and ignorance. The combination of â€Å"realists† and â€Å"idealists† play a central role in giving democracy the vitality and appeal it enjoys around the world today. The promotion of democracy worldwide advances the national security of the United States. It promotes national security by arguing that such policy makes for better relations with other people Hence this satisfies realist demand that the country thinks of its interests which are defined in terms of the international organization of power (Smith 224).   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Another solution dealing with apathy and ignorance is involving students in the Globa... ...ople around the world. Similar nations look up to us as a model for supporting, governing, and entertaining for their lifestyles and cultures. To solve our socio- economic problems, it is necessary that we look back at our following countries and learn from them. Works Cited Issues and Studies: A Monthly Journal of Communist Problems and World Affairs. Multipolarity: Myth or Reality? Ray C. Hillam Visiting Professor. Department of Political Science. National Taiwan University Volume X August 1974 Number 11 pages 2-24 Foreign Affairs The Rise of the Virtual State Richard Rosecrance Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Relations at the University of California, Los Angeles Volume 75 July and August 1996 Number 4 Global Awareness Homepage New Twentieth Century Fund Book â€Å"America’s Mission† Tony Smith pages 218-233

Yahoo! Internal Analysis

The Company When Yahoo! was founded in 1994 by Stanford Ph. D. students, David Filo and Jerry Yang, it began as their hobby and has evolved into a global brand that has changed the way people communicate with each other, find and access information, and make purchases. Today, Yahoo! Inc. is the Internet's leading global consumer and business Services Company, offering a comprehensive network of essential services for Web users around the globe as well as businesses of all sizes. As the first online navigational guide to the Web, Yahoo! www. yahoo. com) is the leader in traffic, advertising, household and business user reach. Yahoo! is also the most recognized and valuable Internet brand globally, reaching over 345 million unique users in 25 countries and 13 languages. The Only Place Anyone Needs To Go Find Anything, Communicate With Anyone, or Buy Anything Serving the world's largest Web audience, Yahoo! remains focused on becoming increasingly essential to the lives of consumers. St arting with its comprehensive, hand-built directory as well as the popular My Yahoo! ervice, Yahoo! offers a broad and deep array of communications, commerce and content services in over 100 distinct properties that lead consumers to make Yahoo! their home on the Internet and wireless devices. Fitting the lifestyles of the mobile consumer, Yahoo! offers an increasing array of essential, personalized, localized and timely information on wireless devices, including wireless phones, two-way pagers and personal digital assistants. Committed to extending content and services beyond the desktop, Yahoo! as the largest global mobile audience and the greatest breadth of wireless products and services of any Web content provider. Becoming Increasingly Essential to Businesses & Enterprises Worldwide As the No. 1 Internet network on corporate desktops, surpassing a 70 percent reach in the U. S. workplace, Yahoo! also offers a range of services for businesses and enterprises of all sizes. Corpor ate Yahoo! is an information portal solution that enables companies to communicate and interact directly with their employees, customers and shareholders over a secure and scalable platform. Yahoo!Broadcast Services is the leading provider of Internet audio and video streaming solutions for corporate and consumer communications, delivering thousands of live and on-demand, corporate events including: product launches, marketing programs, training/distance learning, keynote addresses, annual shareholder meetings, and quarterly earnings calls. Yahoo! ‘s Small Business services enable small businesses and professionals to establish and grow a business presence with services such as Yahoo! Domains, Yahoo! Website Services, Yahoo! Servers and Yahoo! Store. An industry leader in online advertising, Yahoo! ffers an integrated set of marketing services through Yahoo! Fusion Marketing that unite Yahoo! ‘s media, e-commerce, direct marketing, broadcast, and communication tools to a llow clients to find any audience, connect with anyone, and sell anything. Yahoo! ‘s data driven services provide unparalleled targeting and measurement capabilities far beyond banners, clicks, and conversions. Customized to integrate clients' traditional marketing programs online, Yahoo! Fusion Marketing programs generate greater customer acquisition and retention, extended brand value, and increased sales in today's global marketplace. SWOT AnalysisThe external environment includes all the factors outside the organization which provide opportunities or pose threats to the organization. The internal environment refers to all the factors within an organization which impart strengths or cause weakness of a strategic nature . The environment in which an organization exists can be, therefore defined as the opportunities and threats operating in the external environment apart from the strengths and weakness existing in the internal environment. A systematic approach to understand the environment of Yahoo is the SWOT analysis. Internal Factor Analysis (IFA) of the Yahoo CorporationStrengths The strength is an inherent capacity which an organization uses to gain a strategic and competitive advantage. The strengths of Yahoo Corporation are: * Yahoo! ‘s Overture is a tremendously profitable Internet advertising business. It focuses on affiliate advertising for large advertising accounts, in the same way as Google's Adsense programme. This is an important income stream for Yahoo!. * Yahoo! has over 500 million users of its services and solutions. This makes it a very powerful marketing company, with a very well known brand. Some reports indicate that it is the most popular website in the World. A key long-term strength is Yahoo! ‘s international business presence. As the Internet expands and it is adopted by more nations the opportunities for Internet brands begin to emerge. Yahoo! is well placed to take advantage of these opportunities with its strat egic business units in Asia, Europe and Australia. * The Yahoo! Directory is an original source of structured information. It has built over the last decade, and unlike mainstream search engines, its content is moderated (i. e. sites are vetted before their inclusion). Weaknesses: A weakness is an inherent limitation or constraint which creates strategic disadvantages for the company.It is overdependence on a single product line, which is potentially risky. The weaknesses of Yahoo are: * As per Jan 2012 data, a survey says yahoo’s market share in search engine is only 6% * Google already has more than 50% market share and the immediate competitors are Baidu which has same 6% and bing has 4% in search engine * Google being the leading the service provider on the internet , is grabbing the revenues from advertisements * Most of the services provided by Yahoo are unknown in the internet space. * Yahoo is ranked 5th in visitors among video sites. YouTube was first owned by Google .There has been near about 3 % slump per year in Yahoo’s image search. * Google search results produce double revenues as compared to Yahoo. * Yahoo is losing its market share in mailing services very gradually due to Google’s strong presence in search engine market and it related product portfolio complementing to search engine services * For Yahoo, differentiation is difficult. Almost all of its services are available from other sources such as Mail services, news, shopping, financial data and business directory services are provided by many others like MSN, CNN, e-bay, Money control etc. The future of Yahoo is uncertain as the technology develops and new unforeseen advertising media emerges. * Financial health of the company is not so promising for the investors. The company’s assets both in terms of intangible and tangible are on the declining side. Matching analysis Match the external factors against the internal factors of YAHOO! Opportunities| Threats| * Internet video advertising spending expected to increase by 82% to $610 million by 2009. * Yahoo! Inc has purchased Flickr. * Broadband expansion. * Yahoo! as a strong and talented employee base. * Yahoo! has penetrated markets that are still untouched by competitors. | * Google commands about 50% of all online searches and Yahoo! has only 24% according to Neilson/NetRating. * Consumer attitudes towards online advertising may become more negative. * Increasing strength of competitors. * Social websites such as MySpace and Facebook are now breaking into the online advertising market. * Google is surpassing Yahoo! in revenues. | Strengths| Weaknesses| * Yahoo! Inc. has beaten Google in the mobile market. * Yahoo!Inc. has many more auxiliary products compared to the competition. * Yahoo! Inc. has strong brand recognition. * Partnerships with MLB, VISA and NFL. * Access is available to anyone with internet access. | * Yahoo! is ranked 5th in visitors among video sites. YouTube which is owned by Google is ranked 1st. * Yahoo! image search has been declining 3% per year. * Google search results generate twice as much revenue as Yahoo!. * Advertising revenues are falling due to Google and other competitors in the market. | Alternative strategies or RecommendationsIt is clear that the Yahoo Corporation has faced some major challenges in staying on top of the Internet market. It is suggested that the corporation should continue to grow its customer base. The corporation can grow its customer base by successfully capturing the international market. In addition, Yahoo can enlarge its target customer statistics by including customers outside the age group of 18-34 like people of above 55 years. Yahoo has to distinguish itself from the rest of its competitors in the Internet market in order to successfully accomplish these objectives.The alternative strategy that the Yahoo Corporation can adopt is: Capturing the international market: In capturing the international market, Yahoo has been comparatively unsuccessful. Though, Yahoo provides its services in a variety of languages but it has been unable to contend with national companies of other countries. For example, in China, Yahoo holds less than 5% of the total Chinese market share. The majority of the China market is dominated by Chinese search engine known as Baidu. com. In August 2005, Google, the American rival has captured a significant portion i. . approximately 33% of the Chinese market. Moreover, near about 71. 3% of the overall international market has been captured by Google. Some of this percentage was grabbed from Yahoo. Yahoo must ensure that internet access is available to its target market in order to strategically grow its customer base. If the target market does not have the means or ability to access services, Yahoo will not be successful. It is important for Yahoo Corporation to capture international customers during the exposure to the Internet. This can create a comfort-zone for its new users.Yahoo also, should become familiar with the likes, dislikes, habits and other characteristics of each niche of the international market. The company should use appropriate marketing channels to create the demand in international market. The marketing techniques like sales promotion, advertising, publicity, etc. will work more effectively to capture international market. Expanding the target market: To become successful, it is important for the Yahoo Corporation to expand its target market. It is important that Yahoo tries to capture those who are its first-time Internet users.Through partnerships with telecommunications providers and cable companies, Yahoo should work to become a primary part of a new Internet service package. Yahoo can successfully get new web users to begin their Internet use. The users use the internet because it allows them to communicate with their friends and family members who are separated geographically. Furthermore, people like the Internet b ecause it allows them to find information and items that they can’t find elsewhere. With this demographic, travel, leisure and financial information tend to be popular.Yahoo should promote its different offerings in publications and media to achieve the best reach and to focus on the particular areas. Yahoo should publicize itself as a source of health information as well as a site that provides travel information for those who plan for retirement. Yahoo should portray itself as a portal of information. Differentiation: To remain competitive, Yahoo should adopt and initiate new projects. The company should begin as a search engine and expand its offerings by including finance, personals and hot Jobs and other activities.For example, Yahoo has realized that the potential users of Yahoo music consequently acquire a significant share of the online music industry. The ability to differentiate itself from its competitors is the main reason for the success of Yahoo. To promote new products, Yahoo is able to take advantage of its brand equity and its large user base. Yahoo should not limit itself to fixed media sites. Yahoo should attempt to commence a multimedia Internet project called runner. This video-intensive and web-based reality TV project will focus on a fugitive crisscrossing the country.Yahoo Corporation should also expand its Internet-based market to compete against traditional media. Conclusion Thus, it is concluded that in the dynamic Internet market, Yahoo is a strong and relatively established company. Its core competence includes focus on young adult users, regularly improving fixed web sites, driving advertising revenue and encouraging employees to be practical. All this points have been a formula for its success. Yahoo must apply aggressive strategies and maintain healthy financial statement to remain competitive.It is important that Yahoo carefully review all these strategies and examine the timing of its initiatives. The company can achiev e its target and growth by hiring competent managers and experienced consultants as well as by remaining focused on its core competencies. By maintaining the strategies, Yahoo will be able to position itself to become a leader in the race for multimedia domination. An understanding of the external environment in terms of opportunities and threats and the internal environment in term of strengths and weaknesses is important for the existence, growth and profitability of Yahoo Corporation.

Plea Bargains In Canadian Law ~ Karla Homolka - 3099 Words

A plea bargain is a negotiation between the defendant and their attorney on one side, and the crown prosecutor on the other side. A plea bargain may give the defendant a lightened sentence, in exchange for either confessing to some crimes, or giving information that is related to the offence, for example, the location of stolen goods or the names and locations of other participants, as well as their part in the offence. There are many advantages to plea negotiations/bargains. For instance, if there is not enough evidence against the defendant to convict them, a plea bargain can help the crown obtain a conviction. They are also good for spending less time and money on a trial in some cases. Lastly, because a plea bargain can help to†¦show more content†¦A 911 call was placed shortly after midnight. When paramedics arrived, Tammy was unresponsive. Paul and Karla claimed they had fallen asleep downstairs in the rec room and were awakened by the sounds of Karla’s 15 year old sister Tammy â€Å"choking†. Tammy was taken in an ambulance to the hospital, and Karla’s parents rode along with her. Karla, her sister Lori, and Paul stayed at the house, and were questioned by a rookie who had been on the job for less than two months, David Weeks. When Constable Weeks received confirmation from the hospital that Tammy was pronounced dead, he had to share the news with the others. Lori became very upset and rushed upstairs to phone her ex boyfriend. After checking on Lori to make sure she was okay, Weeks went to check on Karla. When he found her, she was doing laundry in the basement, shoving the blankets that Tammy had vomited on into the running washing machine. Weeks asked her to stop, removed the blankets and lead her back to the couch for more questioning, where Lori and Karla began hugging and crying. This was error number one. The fact that Karla was trying to wash the blankets with Tammy’s vomit on them, moments after she heard she had been pronounced dead was extremely suspicious. Still, it was never investigated. She wasn’t questioned as to why she was washing them, and it was never recorded. This may be due to the fact that the policeman on duty did not have enough experience in the field but it is stil l an error that couldShow MoreRelatedPlea-Bargains: Currency of the Courts An Examination of the Effectiveness of Plea-Bargain Within our Court Systems1477 Words   |  6 Pagesâ€Å"Rahim Jaffer case heads for plea-bargain†; former Alberta MP Rahim Jaffer was being charged on cocaine possession and drunk-driving charges; his case was likely to be resolved with a plea-bargain agreement (Makin, 2010). This is but one case of many that are settled though a plea-bargain agreement. Plea-bargaining can take the form of a sentence reduction, a withdrawal or stay of other charges, or, a promise not proceed on other charges, in exchange for a guilty plea by an accused. During discussionRead More Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka: Canadian Rapists/Murderers1976 Words   |  8 PagesPaul Bernardo and Karla Homolka: Canadian Rapists/Murderers Paul Bernardo was a well liked child by all the parents in the neighbourhood, he was pleasant and friendly.   Although, when he was a sixteen, he got into an argument with his mother and she told him about how he was a illegitimate child and showed him the picture of his real father for whom she had an affair with.   Paul was devastated and after the incident he did not get along with his mother.   He started to hang around a tough crowdRead MoreThe Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Essay2466 Words   |  10 PagesThe Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was signed into law by Queen Elizabeth II April 17, 1982. Often referred to as the Charter, it affirms the rights and freedoms of Canadians in the Constitution of Canada. The Charter encompasses fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, language rights and equality rights. The primary function of the Charter is to act as a regulatory check between Federal, Provincial and Territorial gover nments and the Canadian people. Being